Because they have sold, for silver, [the righteous]1: The poor innocent who was acquitted in court — they would sell him his own acquital, for they would only acquit him if he would give them a bribe, and he had to buy his acquital from them in order for them to see him locked and closed up in the clutches of his adversary in court, who had had no evidence2 against him.3 And also there is in its contextual sense4 that they would sell the merit of the innocent to the one who opposed him in court, by means of a money-bribe, in order that he would be locked5 and closed up and transmitted into their hands, in so far as he didn’t have an advocate in court. And also one should say that since he was locked and closed up against his will, and in hunger, and deprived of everything, they would drive him away from his merit and from his inheritance, by means of money,6 and they would have no compassion upon him to pledge to him whatever he lacked.7 The result would be that the estate of the righteous heir, who had merited it from his ancestors, would be turned over to others. Not only that, but they would steal it outright from him; that is what is said.
1. The end of the verse is not actually found in the manuscript, in the comment’s incipit.
2. Lit., “mouth.”
3. Rabbi Eliezer follows his predecessors Rashi and R. Yosef Kara, who based their interpretation on the Aramaic Targum. This ancient rabbinic translation had rendered the MT ואביון בעבור נעלים ve-evyon ba’avur na’alayim (“and the needy, for a pair of sandals”) as חשיכיא בדיל דיחסנון, ve-hasikhaya bedil deyahsenun (“and the poor, so that they might take possession of/hoard up/lock up [his property]”), perhaps reflecting a different Hebrew vorlage (נעלם?)). For a discussion of the meaning of this difficult vocable, see Paul (1991), 77–79.
4. Heb. משמעו, mashma’o. This is one of several terms employed by the northern French rabbinic exegetes to indicate departure from the older rabbinic, “midrashic” understanding of Scripture. This term is somewhat analogous to the way contemporary Christian exegetes might use the term sensus litteralis. Among rabbinic exegetes, the more common term is פשוטו, peshuto or פשט, peshat; if either term is encountered in the eleventh century commentaries of Rashi, we might best translate the term as “plain meaning” (as opposed to midrash). However, by the twelfth century, when Rabbi Eliezer wrote his commentaries, we can be more certain in translating the term as “context.” Again, see Harris, “Concepts of Scripture in the School of Rashi,” in Jewish Concepts of Scripture: A Comparative Introduction, 102–22.
5. It may be that, in presenting the biblical text’s נעלים, na’alayim (“sandals”as though it were a reference to the poor man being “locked up” (נעולים, n’ulim), Rabbi Eliezer is understanding wordplay to be present in the prophetic rhetoric. However, he generally will articulate the presence of wordplay in a composition through the expression לשון נופל על לשון, lashon nofel al lashon, literally, “tongue/language falling on tongue/language.” For a full discussion on the awareness of paranomasia in Rabbi Eliezer’s exegesis, see Harris (1997), 221–51; and Robert A. Harris, “Twelfth-Century Biblical Exegetes and the Invention of Literature,” in The Multiple Meaning of Scripture: The Role of Exegesis in Early-Christian and Medieval Culture (Ienje van ‘t Spijker, ed. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009), 311–29 (327).
6. I.e., a bribe.
7. Rabbi Eliezer evokes here the language of Deuteronomy 15:8.