Gate 96

Some problems in the text of our Parshah:

1) Why is the mitzvah of establishing cities of refuge appended to our Parshah, or at least the report about these cities having been set aside?

2) Why does the Torah describe involuntary manslaughter as occurring "in a forest?⁠"

3) Why is premeditated murder also discussed in this chapter?

4) How does the legislation of "moving boundaries" fit into this chapter?

5) What is the rationale for punishing a certain type of witness for the harm he had intended to cause the potential victim, whereas he is not punished for the harm he has actually caused?

1) On the two previous occasions when the Torah deals with the "city of refuge" legislation, the point had been to teach us that the law treats unintentional crime differently from intentional crime; now the message is that since all other pieces of legislation dealing with law giving and law enforcement have been revealed, the practical observance of the city of refuge legislation can no longer be delayed. From now on, everyone who trespasses, is considered an intentional sinner. (since the law is known) Therefore the machinery to protect the person who is clearly an unintentional sinner has to be put in operation. This is why on this occasion we read about such details as erecting signposts pointing to the nearest "city of refuge.⁠" (Makkot 10)

2) The reason the Torah describes death as having occurred in a forest etc., is to teach that when it is evident through the circumstances where it occurred, that there could not have been criminal intent, then, even if there had been a feud between the two parties involved, the killer is believed, and he may take refuge in the city set aside for that purpose. Only, if in addition to the "hatred" between the two parties, there is evidence of an ambush, does the city of refuge not protect such a killer. In such an event, the killer is subject to retribution by human hands despite the absence of witnesses. The word im, in 19,8, refers back to the beginning of the subject matter in verse two. Once the West Bank would be conquered, the three cities Moses had designated on the East Bank would become operative. "You will add three more such cities on the West Bank as soon as practicable.⁠"

4) Once we have established the principle that certain tribal areas such as the city of refuge, can be expropriated due to national considerations, it would be an easy step to expropriate other tribal lands, say for the use of the king, the army etc. The Torah therefore has to mention the law of hassagat gevul, unlawful shifting of boundaries, to prevent anyone from taking advantage of the fact that there is such a thing as placing the public interest ahead of the private interest.

3) Since the subject matter has been how to distinguish between wilful and unintentional murder, something difficult to determine without evidence, i.e. witnesses, the Torah now sums up what is considered adequate testimony, i.e. two eye witnesses. The law concerning false witnesses follows.

5) The words "as they had planned,” as meaning prior to conviction and execution on the basis of such testimony, seems to concern itself with the reputation of the Court of Law. Undermining people's confidence in the infallibility and/or integrity of the Court when the harm cannot be undone, is counterproductive. This consideration goes so far as to deny slanderous witnesses the right to withdraw their testimony once the Court has ruled and given its verdict. (Sanhedrin 44) Even when the witnesses advance plausible reasons for their original evidence, and the accused had always protested his innocence, no redress is possible at that stage. Such instances prove, that in the last analysis we rely on God as the Supreme Judge. He would not let an innocent person become the victim of such perfidious testimony. Would we decide otherwise, the people would question the wisdom and competence of such a Court forthwith. If this is so when there is a chance to reopen the proceedings, then it is certainly so when the victim of such testimony has already been executed and could not be resurrected. We note that on occasion upholding the image of our judiciary is more important than the anguish of the family of the accused. The victim himself is presumed guilty of a crime carrying a similar penalty, though in this particular case he may have been convicted unjustly.